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Abstract
We analyze macroeconomic stabilization in a small open economy which faces a large
recession in the rest of the world. We show analytically that for the economy to remain
isolated from the external shock, the exchange rate must depreciate not only upfront, to
offset the collapse in external demand, but also persistently to decouple domestic prices
from deflation in the rest of the world. If monetary policy becomes constrained by the
zero lower bound, the scope of exchange rate depreciation is limited and the economy
is no longer isolated from the shock. Still, in this case there is a “benign coincidence”:
fiscal policy is particularly effective in stabilizing economic activity. Under fixed exchange
rates, instead, the impact of the external shock is particularly severe and the effectiveness
of fiscal policy limited.
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1 Introduction
The case for flexible exchange rates rests on the ability of monetary policy to adjust its
stance and let the exchange rate depreciate or appreciate in response to shocks. Hence, even
economies with floating exchange rates may suffer notably as a consequence of large external
shocks, if monetary policy becomes constrained by the the zero lower bound (ZLB) on interest
rates. Although the nature of the ZLB constraint is quite different from that implied by an
exchange rate peg or participation in a currency union, the implications for macroeconomic
resilience in the face of external shocks are potentially severe.
This has been illustrated forcefully during the great recession. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
output and exchange rates in four Scandinavian countries after 2007. Two of these countries
have given up exchange rate flexibility: Finland is a member of the euro area; Denmark
operates an independent currency, but maintains a narrow peg to the euro. The other two,
Sweden and Norway, pursue inflation targeting, but only in Sweden did policy rates fall to
the ZLB in 2009–10. The left panel shows a sizeable output contraction for Finland and
Denmark, but not for Norway. The contraction in Sweden, in turn, is much larger than in
Norway and, in fact, as strong as in Denmark and Finland. The right panel shows that the
Norwegian Krone and the Swedish Krona both depreciated sharply during the first year of
the crisis, but initially the depreciation was stronger in Norway.
In this paper, we reassess the ability of the exchange rate to act as shock absorber. We do
so from the vantage point of a small open economy facing a great recession, during which
demand and inflation in the rest of the world collapse. We provide a comparative analysis
of stabilization policy across exchange rate regimes, explicitly accounting for constraints on
monetary policy—be it the ZLB or an exchange rate peg—as well as for the monetary-fiscal
policy mix. Indeed, it is well understood that an effective fiscal policy requires an adequate
degree of monetary accommodation (see, e.g, Woodford, 2011). This may be jeopardized in
the absence of exchange rate flexibility, or with policy rates at the zero lower bound.
We find that during a global great recession the case for flexible exchange rates in a small
open economy is actually stronger still than classic arguments suggest (for the classic case, see
Friedman, 1953). Provided that the central bank is not constrained in pursuing its inflation
objective, the role of floating rates as a shock absorber vis-a`-vis an adverse shock to global
demand is twofold. First, upfront real depreciation counteracts the fall in net exports driven
by the contraction of external demand. Second, further, sustained depreciation decouples
domestic prices from the deflationary crawl in the rest of the world.
Importantly, floating rates continue to be beneficial even if the external shock is so large
that domestic policy rates become constrained by the ZLB. Anticipating a future monetary
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Figure 1: Real GDP (left) and change of exchange rate (end of quarter price of euro, in
local currency) in four Scandinavian countries. Sample period: 2007Q4–2012Q4. GDP is
normalized to 100 Percent in 2007Q4, the exchange rate is expressed in percentage changes
relative to 2007Q4. Source: OECD Economic Outlook 98 and Bundesbank.
expansion, the exchange rate still depreciates (although less than in the unconstrained case),
thereby providing some isolation from the adverse developments in the rest of the world. In
addition, floating exchange rates allow fiscal stimulus to become more effective precisely when
monetary policy can deliver less stabilization—a “benign coincidence.”
The opposite holds in case of a fixed exchange rate regime. Lack of exchange rate flexibility
not only exposes the economy fully to the adverse consequences of the external demand shock.
It also amplifies the transmission of a global great recession. This is so because fixed exchange
rate anchor the domestic price level to the foreign deflationary crawl. Anticipated domestic
inflation, in turn, pushes up domestic real interest rates and induces a collapse of internal
demand. Last but not least, as the external nominal anchor keeps it tied to inflation abroad,
an exchange rate peg also prevents fiscal policy from having a significant and persistent
effects on domestic inflation. Very much at odds with the received wisdom, fiscal policy is
not necessarily more effective in a fixed exchange rate. Rather, the benign coincidence breaks
down.
We establish these results analytically in a stylized framework as well as through model
simulations. To state our results as clearly as possible, we build on the workhorse monetary
model of a small open economy in its standard New Keynesian specification.1 Throughout
our analysis, we posit a large rise in world preferences for current savings. This shock cannot
be fully offset by appropriate monetary policy measures in the rest of the world and, thus,
1In the New Keynesian specification, the small open economy takes the global equilibrium as given but
maintains some monopoly power on its terms of trade—see, for instance, Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005) and De
Paoli (2009) which, in turn, build the New Open Economy Macroeoconomics literature (Obstfeld and Rogoff,
1996).
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causes a sustained drop in rest-of-the world demand, as well as rest-of-the world deflation.
The exchange rate regime entertained by the small open economy that is faced with these
global developments is essential in determining to what extent the domestic economy remains
insulated from both the real drag from the rest-of-the world and the global deflationary
pressure.
To verify the robustness of our findings to varying the degree of capital market integration
and financial frictions, we consider model extensions which capture financial imperfections.
Building on previous work of ours (Corsetti et al., 2013b), we consider economies in which
there is limited risk sharing and vulnerability to sovereign risk crises, which may spill over
to borrowing costs and conditions faced by the private sector (a mechanism that we dub
“sovereign-risk channel”). We find that this modification has little bearing on the transmission
of the external shock to the small open economy under consideration. Yet, the “sovereign risk
channel” causes fiscal policy to become much less effective in stabilizing economic activity
exactly when monetary policy is constrained. This is so particularly under a peg.
Our paper relates to an emerging literature which has begun to reassess the costs and benefits
of flexible exchange rates in light of recent developments. In line with Schmitt-Grohe´ and
Uribe (2015) we show that macroeconomic adjustment is indeed particularly painful under
a currency peg. The mechanisms that they and we highlight differ, though. Whereas we
highlight the lack of effectiveness of both monetary and fiscal stabilization policy, they see
wage-setting frictions as the central element. Krugman (2014) emphasizes the benefits of
flexible exchange rates in the face of sovereign risk. The paper in the literature closest to ours
is Cook and Devereux (2014). They show within a two-country model that a flexible exchange
rate regime can make an economy more, rather than less, vulnerable to a large shock. The
main difference to our work is the focus and main scenario of the analysis. Whereas we
focus on the transmission of a large adverse external shock to a small open economy, they
focus on the domestic stabilization of a large domestic demand shock.2 Amador et al. (2016)
instead consider how to overcome the ZLB problem via exchange rate and international reserve
policies in a world with segmented financial markets, motivated by the case study of large
capital inflows into Switzerland.
A number of recent studies have emphasized that fiscal policy is particularly effective in
stabilizing open economies once monetary policy becomes constrained by the ZLB (Cook and
Devereux, 2011; Erceg and Linde´, 2012). That the effectiveness of fiscal policy is limited, on
2Cook and Devereux (2013) study the case for international policy coordination if in one of two countries
monetary policy becomes constrained by the zero lower bound. As regards empirical work Berkmen et al.
(2012) document evidence that exchange-rate flexibility seems to have mitigated the adverse impact of the
Great Recession.
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the other hand, under an exchange rate peg has been highlighted by earlier studies as well
(Corsetti et al., 2013a; Farhi and Werning, 2012).3 In the present paper we reconsider those
findings in circumstances where a need for effective stabilization arises from a large external
shock.
Finally, a recent body of literature has reconsidered macroeconomic and stabilization issues
when the global economy is in a secular stagnation steady state, whereby inefficiently low
economic activity at the zero lower bound is a permanent, rather than a temporary, condition,
see (Caballero et al., 2015; Eggertsson et al., 2016). Taking the vantage point of a small open
economy, exactly as in the present paper, (Corsetti et al., 2016) study the conditions under
which a single country can escape stagnation and reach a full-employment steady state. While
the escape path and policies are not strictly comparable with the dynamic response to the
external shock studied in this paper, there is a notable common conclusion: exchange rate
flexibility is required to ensure that domestic inflation rises enough and overcome the zero
lower bound problem, while the country’s net foreign asset absorbs its excess saving. Exchange
rate flexibility appears once more a pre-condition for maintaining full employment when the
world suffer a slump, independently of whether this is temporary or permanent.
The text is organised as follows. Section 2 outlines the model by focusing on a log-linear
approximation of the equilibrium conditions. Section 3 provides a number of closed-form
results on the transmission and stabilization of a great recession under alternative policy
scenarios in the small open economy. Section 4 illustrates the quantitative relevance of these
results through model simulations. It also provides results for a modified environment with
financial friction and sovereign risk. Section 5 concludes.
2 A New Keynesian small open-economy model
We conduct our analysis in a standard New Keynesian framework, using a version of the
two-country model put forward in Corsetti et al. (2012). Both countries produce a variety of
country-specific intermediate goods, with the number of intermediate good producers in the
world normalized to unity. Goods market integration is incomplete due to home bias. Hence,
while we assume that the law of one price holds at the level of intermediate goods, purchasing
power parity fails in the short run. The countries have isomorphic structures, but may differ
in terms of size, policies, and shocks.
We build a scenario in which a small open economy faces a great recession in the rest of the
world. For this purpose we make the following assumptions. First, the size of the domestic
3Erceg and Linde´ (2012), however, highlight the importance of price rigidities for the relative size of the
government spending multiplier at the ZLB and under an exchange rate peg.
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economy (“Home”) in the world economy approaches zero, while the rest of the world is
consolidated in “Foreign”. As a result, Home behaves like a small open economy, while
Foreign behaves like a closed economy.4 Second, the only source of variation at the world
level is a foreign “saving shock.” This shock effectively alters the time-discount factor. Such
preference shocks are frequently used to model an exogenous variation of the intertemporal
allocation of private expenditures (for a textbook treatment see Gal´ı, 2015). In order to
determine the effect of the shock on Home, one needs to know the effect of the shock on
foreign demand and prices. We shall, third, assume that the shock in Foreign occurs when
monetary policy in Foreign is unable to contain its effect.
Importantly, while our focus is on Home, we are explicit about the dynamics in Foreign so
that the external shock which impacts Home is fully micro-founded. As a result we may
account for the cross-equation restrictions of the model along two dimensions. First, the
saving shock in Foreign impacts Home not only via goods markets, but also via financial
markets.5 Second, the model restricts the joint dynamics of output and inflation in Foreign
during a great recession thus modelled. As we shall see, the dynamics of both of these matter
for Home. 6
The structure of the model is well-known. We give a detailed description in Appendix A. In
the following, instead, we provide a compact exposition, based on a log-linear approximation
of the equilibrium conditions around a deterministic and symmetric zero-inflation steady
state. Output is normalized to one. In both the appendix and the text, foreign variables are
indexed with a star. Variables carry a time-subscript, t. Variables without a hat refer to log
deviations from the steady state. Variables that carry a hat refer to deviations in levels. We
begin with Foreign and discuss the equilibrium conditions in Home afterwards.
In order to simplify the exposition, and derive tractable pencil-and-paper solutions, we ini-
tially posit that financial markets are complete across borders, and make some simplifying
assumptions. These assumptions will be relaxed later, when we resort to numerical simula-
tions, with little effect as to the qualitative conclusions of our analysis.
4In this case Home is identical to the small open economy of Gal´ı and Monacelli (2005), except for the fact
that we allow for government consumption and restrict preferences to log-utility.
5The global fall in demand (including the demand for the Home output), and the adjustment in the world
interest rate and the price of foreign exports are all taken as given by the small open economy. Because of the
fluctuation in the relative price of Home to foreign consumption, however, full insurance via complete markets
does not insulate Home consumption from the external shock.
6Throughout our analysis, we will assume that policymakers are discretionary, hence we will abstract from
issues in forward guidance, whose effectiveness requires some degree of credibility of policy announcement,
and its puzzling effectiveness in theoretical models, possibly reflecting both a high degree of credibility of the
policy and specific features of the monetary transmission mechanism in new-Keynesian models, see Giannoni
et al. (2016). By the same token, we will also abstract from non-conventional balance sheet policies, such
as Quantitative Easing. As stressed by Gertler and Karadi (2011), the latter can have a strong effect in the
framework of the model extension studied in section 4.3, but its study is beyond the scope of our paper.
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2.1 Foreign
Under our assumptions, Foreign operates like a closed economy. The equilibrium dynamics
of output, y∗t , inflation, pi∗t , and nominal interest rates, r∗t , are driven by the dynamics of the
saving shock in Foreign, ξ∗t . We will specify a law of motion for the shock later. The evolution
of the foreign economy is captured by the following three equations. The first is the dynamic
IS-equation:
y∗t = Ety
∗
t+1 − (r∗t − Etpi∗t+1 + Et∆ξ∗t+1). (1)
Here Et is the expectations operator and ∆ marks the difference operator. We abstract from
government consumption in Foreign. Next, there is the New Keynesian Phillips curve:
pi∗t = βEtpi
∗
t+1 + κ (ϕ+ 1) y
∗
t . (2)
Here β is the steady-state time-discount factor. κ := (1 − α)(1 − βα)/α measures the slope
of the Phillips curve, with α ∈ [0, 1) measuring the degree of price stickiness. ϕ > 0 is the
inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. The next (and last) equation for Foreign is an
instrument rule for the foreign central bank that describes the behavior of monetary policy.
We assume that
r∗t = max{φpipi∗t − Et∆ξ∗t+1,−(1− β)}. (3)
Here, φpi > 1 is the response to inflation in normal times. Foreign monetary policy can become
constrained by the ZLB, however, explaining the max operator. As long as the foreign central
bank can pursue rule (3) without being constrained by the ZLB, the time-discount factor
shock does not have an effect on foreign inflation or output. In this case, Foreign monetary
policy implements the flexible price allocation under which the saving shock is fully absorbed
by changes in the real rate of interest. If, instead, policy becomes constrained the flexible-
price allocation can no longer be implemented by monetary policy (alone). In this case eqs.
(1)–(2) restrict the joint dynamics of output and inflation in Foreign.
2.2 Home
While the dynamics in Foreign are independent of what happens in Home, Foreign does matter
for Home. The following set of equations describes the equilibrium dynamics in Home, given
the realization of Foreign variables. The dynamic IS-relation in Home is:
yt = Etyt+1 − (1−$)Et∆y∗t+1 − Et∆gˆt+1 + [1− υ −$] ∆ξ∗t+1 −$(rt − EtpiH,t+1). (4)
Here gˆt denotes government expenditure (in units of output). In the steady state, government
consumption is zero. We allow for positive government consumption shocks in Home. Gov-
ernment spending is financed through lump-sum taxes and falls exclusively on domestically
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produced goods. The term (1 − $)y∗t captures external demand for domestically produced
goods (as a function of foreign output), where $ := 1 − υ(2 − υ)(1 − σ). Here υ ∈ (0, 1)
measures the degree of openness, with a low value of υ implying a strong home bias (little
openness), and σ > 0 measures the trade-price elasticity of international demand.7 In deriv-
ing the above equation, we have substituted for Home consumer-price inflation rates. Thus,
what remains in the IS-equation is producer-price inflation, piH,t.
The New Keynesian Phillips curve links inflation to expected inflation, as well as a number
of variables that determine the evolution of marginal costs in our small open economy
piHt = βEtpiHt+1 + κ
{(
ϕ+$−1
)
yt − $˜−1[(1−$)yˆ∗t + gˆt] +
1− υ −$
$
ξ∗t
}
. (5)
Note that both the dynamic IS-relation and the New Keynesian Phillips curve in Home are
a function of foreign output (that is the same as foreign consumption) as well as the foreign
saving shock, which enter the equations as separate arguments. This is because a foreign
saving shock spills over internationally through two channels. The first is a direct demand
channel: given prices, a saving shock leads to less foreign demand for domestic goods—this
is the key effect of a global recession that we wish to focus on in our analysis. The second
channel works through prices: because of home bias in consumption, for given relative prices
the fall in Foreign demand falls disproportionately on foreign-produced goods. In equilibrium,
the relative price of foreign-produced goods must fall, which in turn crowds out demand for
domestic goods.
Our aim is to provide tractable analytical expressions for the impact of the demand shock
and fiscal spending. Therefore, we make the following
Parametric assumption: The parameters governing openness (υ) and the trade elasticity
(σ) are related as 1− σ = (2− υ)−1.
The above constraint implies 1−υ−$ = 0, so that the foreign savings shock disappears from
equations (4) and (5) and we can focus on the demand channel. Note also that in this case
external demand for domestically produced goods is simply given by υy∗t . The assumption
greatly simplifies the readability of the analytical expressions that we derive below. However,
it turns out it is not consequential for our main results. Namely, for the numerical solutions
of the model we will not impose this assumption and still find the results (shown in Section
4) fully bear out the main implications that we derive analytically.
The terms of trade in Home, st, are defined as the price of imports relative to the price of
exports. Foreign being large, the foreign consumer price level equals the foreign producer
7External demand for domestically produced goods thus increases with foreign output as long as σ < 1.
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price level. With the law of one price assumed to hold, and producer currency pricing, we
have that
st = et + p
∗
t − pH,t. (6)
Here et is the nominal exchange rate, defined as the price of foreign currency in units of
domestic currency, p∗t is the (consumer and producer) price level in Foreign and pH,t is the
producer price level in Home. Note that piH,t = pH,t − pH,t−1 and pi∗t = p∗t − p∗t−1.
In equilibrium, demand for domestically-produced goods satisfies
yt = (1− υ)st + gˆt + y∗t − (1− υ)ξ∗t . (7)
This is derived from goods market clearing for domestically-produced goods using the risk
sharing condition under complete international financial markets.8 All else equal, Home
output depends positively on foreign demand, the terms of trade and Home government
consumption.
The model is closed by specifying the monetary policy regime in Home. We will, in the next
section, consider three different scenarios: an independent monetary policy in Home that
follows the analog of rule (3), with and without being constrained by the ZLB, as well as the
case of a currency peg.
In equilibrium, eqs. (4)–(7) determine a sequence of Home variables {yt, piH,t, pH,t, st, et, rt, gˆt}∞t=0,
given a specification of (i) monetary policy in Home, (ii) fiscal policy in Home, (iii) piH,t =
pH,t − pH,t−1, (iv) the sequence {y∗t , pi∗t , p∗t , ξ∗t }∞t=0, as well as initial conditions (p∗−1, pH,−1).
3 The impact of a global recession
In this section we provide analytical insight on the transmission of a large external demand
shock to Home—a small open economy specialized in the production of country-specific va-
rieties. We study, in particular, how the effects of the shock vary with the extent to which
monetary instruments in Home are constrained, either by the zero lower bound or by a com-
mitment to an exchange rate peg. Then, we analyze how effectively fiscal instruments can
substitute for monetary ones in each regime.
Throughout, we focus on the effect of the saving shock in Foreign that directly affects only
foreign households. The effect of this shock on global demand and production, the world
interest rate and the prices of goods produced abroad are endogenous to the world economy.
From the vantage point of the (small) domestic economy, however, they are exogenous. And
8Again, in our setup complete financial markets do not imply equal consumption in Home and Foreign
because of home bias. Moreover, the saving shock will affect consumption-risk sharing, as it impacts the
marginal utility in Foreign.
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so is the decline of world demand for domestically-produced goods and the price drift in
foreign exports denoted in foreign currency.
More in detail, the great recession scenario is modeled as follows: in the initial period (t = 0),
foreign households become more patient, so that ξ∗t drops to ξ∗L < 0. Each period afterwards,
with probability µ ∈ (0, 1) ξ∗t will remain at that same low level for another period, or
otherwise permanently revert to the level of ξ∗t = 0. Having the great recession in mind, we
will—in addition—assume that the shock hits the foreign economy when foreign monetary
policy does not respond to the shock, for example, because the foreign economy was at its
zero lower bound to start with. That is, the foreign interest rate, r∗t , does not react to
the demand shock while the shock lasts. Government spending in Home follows the same
stochastic structure as the savings shock in Foreign. Throughout the paper, we shall focus
on those cases only in which the equilibrium is determinate both in Foreign and in Home.
Parameters of the model are restricted to satisfy the determinacy conditions in each scenario.
3.1 The impact on Foreign
With these assumptions, we obtain a unique representation of the dynamics of foreign output
and foreign prices. Output and inflation in Foreign inherit the Markov property of the saving
shock, that is, they will look the same in any period in which the shock lasts. We use the
subscript “L” to indicate the value that endogenous variables take during the shock period
(for “Low”). The impact of the shock on output in Foreign is given by
y∗L =
(1− βµ)(1− µ)
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=1/χ>1
ξ∗L. (8)
It is important to note here that χ < 1 and decreasing in the persistence of the shock
µ. In words, due to the ZLB constraint binding in Foreign, the discount-factor shock has
a disproportionate effect on Foreign’s output. This effect tends to be stronger the more
persistent the shock is and the longer foreign monetary policy remains constrained.
Foreign inflation also falls in response to the negative shock:
pi∗L =
κ(1 + ϕ)(1− µ)
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
ξ∗L. (9)
3.2 The impact on Home
Having characterized the evolution of foreign demand (output) and foreign inflation, we take
the vantage point of the small open economy (Home) next. We will consider three types of
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policy environments. In turn, we will assume that the Home monetary policy either (i) permits
floating exchange rates and is unconstrained by the zero lower bound; (ii) is constrained by
the zero lower bound for some time amid a floating exchange rate; (iii) is constrained by a
credible (and permanent) currency peg.
3.2.1 Unconstrained monetary policy in Home
We begin by revisiting, analytically, a classic result: under flexible exchange rates a small
open economy has the ability to stabilize the output gap and inflation in response to a large
external-demand shock. It can do so through its own monetary policy, as long as this policy
remains unconstrained. To show this, we postulate that the monetary authority in Home is
able to implement a rule akin to that in Foreign, but unconstrained by the zero lower bound:
rt = φpiH,t + r
n
t , with φ > 1. (10)
where rnt is the natural rate of interest in Home. Under our shock scenario, r
n
t will be zero
after the shock has ceased. Otherwise,
rnL =
(1− µ)ϕ
1 + ϕ(1− υ) (υy
∗
L + gˆL) .
Here gˆL is the value that government consumption in Home is assumed to take during the
shock episode. By following rule (10), Home monetary policy targets producer-price inflation
and adjusts policy rates to changes in the natural rate of interest. Combining the interest rate
rule specified above with equations (4) and (5), we can determine the equilibrium interest rate,
inflation and output in Home. The model shows the well-established isomorphism between
open and closed-economy settings, as is common in New Keynesian models (Clarida et al.,
2001). This is not to say that openness is irrelevant for Home. It matters for Home through
openness parameter υ. In addition, openness matters here by opening the door to external
shocks.
Moreover, provided that the central bank follows the rule above, we obtain the other well-
known result (see, for instance, Gal´ı, 2015, chapter 4): with complete markets and in the
absence of markup shocks, rule (10) above supports the flexible-price allocation. In particular,
there is no inflation (piH,t = 0) and output equals:
yL =
1
1 + ϕ(1− υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
(υy∗L + gˆL) . (11)
Flexible exchange rates under stable producer prices partly isolate Home from the exter-
nal shock: Home output, yL, falls by less than external demand, υy
∗
L, meaning that the
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external-demand multiplier dytd(υy∗t )
is smaller than unity. The isolation in terms of output is
not complete, though. Rather, monetary policy stabilizes Home output at the natural level.
Under the assumptions made above, the natural level of output declines in response to the
external shock. Another way to read equation (11) is that a one percent fall in foreign output
will translate into less than an υ-percent fall in Home output. Naturally, the impact of the
foreign shock increases in the openness parameter υ (which determines the exports-to-GDP
ratio in steady state).
It is instructive to analyze the accompanying movements in the terms of trade and the nominal
exchange rate. The following expression for the terms of trade can be derived by combining
the solution for output (11) with the market-clearing condition equation (7):
sL = −
[
1− χ+ υϕ
1 + ϕ(1− υ)
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
y∗L −
ϕ
1 + ϕ(1− υ) gˆ
∗
L. (12)
We observe that the terms of trade in Home automatically and unambiguously depreciate if
foreign output—and hence external demand—declines. Expansionary government spending
in Home, all else equal, appreciates the Home terms of trade.
The following expressions illustrate how exactly the nominal exchange rate operates as a
shock absorber in our environment, as long as monetary policy in unconstrained. From (6),
the nominal exchange rate, et, is given by
et = st + pH,t − p∗t , (13)
As long as monetary policy can and does pursue price stability in Home, we have pH,t = 0.
In this case, taking first differences of equation (13) implies
∆et = ∆st − pi∗t . (14)
Two observations are in order. First, the movement in the nominal exchange rate perfectly
insulates the domestic economy from movements in foreign inflation. In our shock scenario,
the nominal exchange rate will depreciate one-to-one with the continuing fall in foreign’s price
level, at the disinflation rate pi∗L < 0. Second, the nominal exchange rate will depreciate in
excess of the foreign deflationary crawl, so as to bring about the depreciation of the terms of
trade required to sustain full employment.
We now solve formally for the Home exchange rate during the global recession. We start from
the UIP condition:
rt − r∗t = Etet+1 − et.
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Iterating and evaluating in period t+ j forward gives:
et+j = Et+j
∞∑
k=0
(r∗t+j+k − rt+j+k) + lim
k→∞
Et+jet+j+k (15)
Given the expression for the nominal exchange rate (13) we can rewrite the limit term in the
expression above by noting that limt→∞ st+j+k = 0. The terms of trade behave in this way
because in the long run the economy converges back to its symmetric steady state (which, in
turn, is an implication of our assumption of complete financial markets and the fact that we
do not consider permanent shocks). So we have for the limit term in (15):
lim
k→∞
Et+jet+j+k = lim
k→∞
Et+j(pH,t+j+k − p∗t+j+k)
= Et+j
∞∑
k=0
(piH,t+j+k − pi∗t+j+k) + (pH,t+j−1 − p∗t+j−1).
Given this expression, we can now write (15) as follows
et+j = Et+j
∞∑
k=0
(r∗t+j+k − rt+j+k + piH,t+j+k + pi∗t+j+k) + (pH,t+j−1 − p∗t+j−1). (16)
Expression (16) is general. We now evaluate it for our crisis scenario (with Home monetary
policy unconstrained), assuming that the shock initially hits in period t. As long as Foreign
remains at the ZLB while the Home is unconstrained, we have r∗t = 0, rt = rnL; also piH,L =
pH,L = 0. Evaluating (16) using these terms and recalling that the probability of staying at
ZLB for another period is always µ, implies
eunconstrainedt+j = −
rnL + pi
∗
L
1− µ − p
∗
t+j−1 > 0. (17)
The inequality follows from our solution for rnL and piL above (both are negative in our
recession scenario). We thus see that there is nominal depreciation in response to the current
and expected ongoing crisis in Foreign. This restores competitiveness (the first term captures
the monetary policy response which aligns the policy rate with the natural rate) and isolates
Home from the deflation abroad. p∗t+j−1 is also negative, and increasingly so as the crisis lasts:
foreign prices are on a downward trajectory and the Home currency depreciates in order to
shield domestic prices from the downward pressure (recall that PPP holds in the long run).
Hence, for as long as the crisis goes on, the exchange rate continues to depreciate.
3.2.2 The zero lower bound constraint under flexible exchange rates in Home
In our second scenario the exchange rate regime in Home is still a float, but now also the
monetary policy in Home is assumed to be constrained when the adverse shock in Foreign
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materializes. Specially, we impose that domestic policy rates are constant as long as the
foreign economy is in the shock state—for example, because Home had been at its zero lower
bound already. So, at least temporarily, the monetary authority in Home is unable to cushion
the foreign shock.
In this case the solution for domestic output is given by:
yL =
(
1 +
µκϕ(1− υ)
(1− µ)(1− βµ)− µκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ))
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Ξ
(υy∗L + gˆL) . (18)
One can show that
1 < Ξ <
1
υ
.
In other words, the external-demand multiplier is unambiguously larger than unity and thus
larger than absent the ZLB constraint in Home, compare (18) with (11). Exchange rate
flexibility alone is not sufficient to insulate the Home economy from the Foreign demand
shock.
While the drop in domestic output will never exceed the drop of output in Foreign, with the
ZLB constraint the output loss due to an external-demand shock can be large. The reason for
why the multiplier is large at the ZLB (and larger than absent the ZLB) has been extensively
explored in the context of fiscal policy (e.g., Woodford, 2011). The fall in external demand
drives down inflation and inflation expectations in a significant and sustained way, causing a
rise in (long-term) real interest rates. Specifically, the solution for inflation is given by:
piH,L =
(1− µ)κϕ
(1− βµ)(1− µ)− µκ(1 + ϕ(1− υ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(υy∗L + gˆL) , (19)
so that Home inflation will fall along with foreign demand.
Next, we turn to the accompanying movements in the terms of trade and the nominal exchange
rate. The solution for the terms of trade for the duration of the shock is given by:
sL = − 1
(1− υ)
[
1− (1− υ)χ− Ξυ]y∗L− 1− Ξ(1− υ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
gˆL. (20)
It is instructive to compare this to the solution for the terms of trade when monetary policy
follows rule (10) in an unconstrained way, that is, to the expression in equation (12) above.
A close inspection of the terms multiplying foreign output reveals that the terms of trade
depreciate to a lesser extent in response to a drop of external demand when the ZLB binds
in Home.9
9While it is difficult to formally establish the sign of the terms of trade response to the external shock, we
consistently find in our numerical experiments the terms of trade to depreciate even when the ZLB binds in
Home.
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We can now turn to expression (16) to solve again for the nominal exchange rate (assuming,
as above, that shock strikes first in period t):
eZLBt+j =
piH,L − pi∗L
1− µ + pH,t+j−1 − p
∗
t+j−1 > 0.
In this expression the inequality follows because while both inflation rates drop below zero,
foreign inflation falls more. Moreover, as piH,L < 0 (and hence pH,t+j−1 < 0) the depreciation
is muted relative to the unconstrained case, that is:
eunconstrainedt+j > e
ZLB
t+j .
This formalizes the notion that the nominal exchange rate does not fulfil its full role as a
shock absorber, once monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB. Still, Home does not fully
import Foreign’s deflationary crawl.
With monetary policy unable to cushion the shock, the question naturally arises if Home may
nonetheless stabilize the economy through fiscal policy. The expressions above directly speak
to this question (see expressions (18) and (19)). In fact, assuming that government spending
is raised by gˆL for as long as the economy is in the shock state, we observe that fiscal policy is
quite effective in raising output: The fiscal multiplier is just as large as the external-demand
multiplier.10 We think of this result as highlighting a “benign coincidence”: if the conditions
are such that, due to the ZLB, the effect of an external demand shock is strongly amplified,
domestic fiscal policy is also particularly effective in stabilizing economic activity.11
The mechanism underlying the power of fiscal policy at the zero lower bound is well under-
stood: higher government spending lowers real interest rates to the extent that fiscal spending
raises expected inflation and provided that its inflationary impact is not met by higher policy
rates (Christiano et al., 2011; Woodford, 2011). Relative to analyses conducted in a closed-
economy setting, our analysis sheds light on the contribution to stabilization of the exchange
rate. Indeed, flexible exchange rates are an important element for the effectiveness of fiscal
policy in the ZLB scenario. The next section will make this clear.
3.2.3 An exchange-rate peg in Home
We turn to our third, and final, scenario for monetary policy in Home. Namely, we now
assume that monetary policy adjusts interest rates so as to ensure the following target for the
10Indeed, since υ < 1, a one percent fall in Foreign output can be offset by an increase of government
spending in Home of less than one percent of GDP.
11Note, however, that while government spending may be used to effectively isolate Home from the external-
demand shock, this also alters the flexible-price allocation. As a result, at the ZLB it is not feasible to restore
the allocation which obtains in the unconstrained case through government spending. To see this, note that if
domestic inflation is fully stabilized, domestic output will not be at the natural level, but at the steady state
level.
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log exchange rate:
et = 0. (21)
Here we abstract from issues pertaining to implementation and from other possible constraints
on monetary policy.12
To understand the implications of an exchange rate peg for the macroeconomic stabilization
in a small open economy, we derive an expression for the evolution of the terms of trade.
Home’s terms of trade are given by the expression in equation (6). With permanently fixed
exchange rates, the terms of trade then evolve as
st − st−1 = pi∗t − piH,t. (22)
We may then subtract from the Phillips curve in Foreign (2) its counterpart in Home (5).
This gives
pi∗t − piH,t = βEt(pi∗t+1 − piH,t+1) + κ
(
χ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]yˆ∗t − ϕgˆt − [1 + ϕ(1− υ)]st
)
. (23)
Organizing terms leads to the following second-order difference equation in the terms of trade:
st = ψst−1 + βψEtst+1 + κψ
[
χ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]y∗t − ϕgˆt
]
, (24)
where ψ = [1 + β+κ(1 +ϕ(1− υ))]−1. Under our assumptions on the structure of the shock,
one can solve this difference equation using the method of undetermined coefficients. We
obtain as a stable solution
st = δst−1 +
κψχ[1 + ϕ(1− υ)]
1− βψ[δ + µ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Φ
y∗t −
κψ
1− βψ[δ + µ]ϕ︸ ︷︷ ︸
:=Γ
gˆt, (25)
where δ := 1−
√
1−4βψ2
2ψβ , with 0 < δ < 1, and Φ ∈ (0, χ), and Γ > 0. Expression (25) shows
that the terms of trade unambiguously appreciate in response to a drop of external demand.
This is in stark contrast with the results for flexible exchange rates, when there was scope
for the terms of trade to depreciate. Intuitively, with the nominal exchange rate fixed, the
adjustment of the terms of trade depends on the relative adjustment of prices in Home and
Foreign. It turns out that in response to the Foreign saving shock, Foreign prices decline more
than in Home—hence the real appreciation.
Two other dimensions set the fixed exchange rate regime apart from the flexible exchange
rate regime. First, if the shock persists, and so y∗L < 0 for some time, the terms of trade
12See, for instance, Benigno et al. (2007). In the event of a binding ZLB constraint, one may think of an
appropriate commitment to future policy rates as a way to ensure the exchange rate peg. Recall that one
scenario we have in mind is the membership of a small open economy within a currency union.
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will not only appreciate in the first period of the shock but will continue to do so going
forward. Second, the terms of trade will not automatically reset once the shock ceases to
exist. Rather, Home’s terms of trade will remain appreciated for an extended period, with
detrimental results on domestic output and inflation even once Foreign no longer suffers from
the shock and foreign demand has reverted to y∗t = 0. This can be best seen by iterating the
expression for the terms of trade backward in time, assuming that prior to the first period
the terms of trade were at their steady-state value (s−1 = 0):
st =
t∑
k=0
δt−k (Φy∗k − Γgˆk) . (26)
In other words, fixed exchange rates not only mean reduced competitiveness upon a negative
foreign demand shock. Worse, fixed exchange rates can mean that these effects keep lingering
after the rest of the world has already recovered from the shock. Similarly, the effect of
reduced competitiveness that goes in hand with higher fiscal spending in Home will be felt
after the fiscal stimulus is no longer provided.
Last, we turn to effect of the shock on Home’s output. By equation (7), we have that
yt = (1− υ)st + (1− χ(1− υ))y∗t + gˆt.
Inserting the expression for the terms of trade under fixed exchange rates, we obtain:
yt = [1− (1− υ)χ]y∗t + (1− υ)
t∑
k=0
δt−kΦy∗k + gˆt − (1− υ)Γ
t∑
k=0
δt−kgˆk. (27)
The impact of the shock on Home’s output will tend to be large in absolute terms. Indeed,
one can show that on impact output in Home will fall more in response to the foreign demand
shock under the peg than in the ZLB scenario discussed earlier. As discussed above, under
floating exchange rates, the terms of trade do change on impact. They are constant thereafter
for as long as the negative demand shock persists. Under the peg, instead, not only is the
adverse effect of the shock on Home output larger on impact, but also do the terms of trade
continue to appreciate, and remain appreciated even after the external demand disturbance is
over. Thus, [CUT for as long as the shock persists,] Home output will be lower under the peg
than under the float (with or without ZLB). Since the demand shock persistently appreciates
the terms of trade, output remains lower under the peg than under floating exchange rates.
At the same time, the government spending multiplier is always smaller than one, and thereby
smaller than under the ZLB. The government will need to commit more resources, on a more
than one-to-one basis, to compensate for any given fall in output due to the external demand
shock. As analyzed in our previous work, a credible exchange rate target amounts to a credible
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commitment to anchoring the domestic price level to that of Foreign in the medium and long
run (Corsetti et al., 2013a). In our scenario above, Foreign suffers from a deep deflationary
downturn. Hence, as Home pegs its own currency to Foreign, it anchors domestic expectations
to a falling price level, causing domestic real interest rates to rise substantially in tandem
with the foreign ones.
Not only does the anchor to the foreign price level implicit in a peg exacerbate the transmission
of the world recession. It is also the reason why fiscal stabilization is not particularly effective
under the peg. This is because any inflationary effects that government spending has in the
short run are offset, over time, by a rebalancing of demand in the goods market, causing
enough (relative) deflation in Home to re-establish purchasing power parity.
4 Quantitative relevance
We now turn to model simulations in order to illustrate the quantitative relevance of our
results. In doing so, we also assess to what extent our results are robust to relaxing the
simplifying assumptions required to carry out our analytical derivations. For our numerical
experiments we adopt the following parameter values (identical in Home and Foreign). Since a
period in the model corresponds to one quarter, the discount factor β is set to 0.99. We assume
that the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, ϕ, takes the value of one. The trade-
price elasticity σ is set equal to 2/3. Home is assumed to be relatively open, corresponding
to υ = 0.3.13 The average price duration is assumed to be four quarters, requiring the Calvo
parameter to be set equal to 0.75. Finally, we assume that the government-spending-to-GDP
ratio is 20 percent in steady state.
For the sake of clarity, we consider the dynamic adjustment to the foreign shock separately
from the dynamic adjustment to an increase in government spending. In the first experiment,
we look at a saving shock in Foreign that cannot be stabilized by foreign monetary policy
because of a zero-lower-bound problem in Foreign. More specifically, we assume that the
foreign policy interest rate is fixed for 10 periods. Afterwards monetary policy in Foreign
targets price stability (pi∗t = 0). We assume that the shock follows an AR(1) process with
persistence parameter 0.5. This assumption ensures that the ZLB in Foreign remains a binding
constraint for as long as the shock has a significant impact. We normalize the size of the shock
so that initially external demand drops by 1 percent of GDP.
In the second experiment, we consider an increase of government consumption in Home,
also equal to 1 percent of GDP, assuming again an AR(1) process, and set the persistence
13These assumptions imply that the restriction imposed on σ and υ which imposed in our analytical deriva-
tions is not satisfied. Yet it turns out that our simulation results are fully in line with our analytical results.
This also true for a wide range of alternative values for σ and υ.
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parameter to 0.9. In all instances, we contrast the adjustment under the three policy scenarios
analyzed above: the case in which an unconstrained monetary policy targets price stability
(piH,t = 0); the case in which monetary policy does not respond to the shock for 10 periods
(and targets price stability afterwards); and the case of a currency peg.
4.1 Domestic implications of a global recession
In Figure 2, we look at the transmission of the Foreign saving shock, which causes a sharp
and persistent contraction in Foreign consumption and inflation (not shown). In each panel
vertical axes measure deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady-state output
(in case of quantities) or percent (in case of prices). From the perspective of the small open
economy, the shock generates a drop of external demand (upper-left panel). In equilibrium,
the shock generates financial inflows corresponding to an external deficit in the trade balance
(depicted in lower-right panel). Contrasting the three scenarios for monetary policy in Home,
we find large differences—notably in terms of the response of domestic output (upper row,
middle panel). Initially, output falls by about four percent under a peg (dash-dotted line),
about two percent if policy rates are fixed for 10 quarters (solid line), and by about one
percent if monetary policy is unconstrained (dashed line).
Several aspects of the transmission mechanism are noteworthy. In case monetary policy is
unconstrained, there is a large upfront cut of interest rates (2nd row, left panel), associated
with a large depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (2nd row, right panel). As a result,
internal demand remains insulated from the full fall-out of the external shock (3rd row,
middle panel). In fact, it actually rises at the margin, since a regime of price stability means
that expectations of inflation remain firmly anchored and the long-term real rate, which is
relevant for the consumption decision, falls with the current and anticipated monetary stance.
Despite nominal depreciation and a weakening of the terms of trade (3rd row, left panel), the
contraction in external demand causes a trade deficit. By pursuing price stability, monetary
policy effectively tilts aggregate demand towards domestic consumption.
Exchange rate flexibility plays a crucial role also when monetary policy in Home is con-
strained by the zero lower bound. The economic outlook worsens relative to that under an
unconstrained monetary policy, since insufficient short-term monetary stimulus means that
domestic demand remains inefficiently low. But the depth of the foreign contraction and
deflation translates into a permanent depreciation of Home’s nominal exchange rate. This
weakens the link with the deflationary drift in Foreign: dynamically, the Home price level falls
somewhat (2nd row, middle panel), but not as much as in Foreign (the latter is not shown
in the figure). The terms of trade depreciate, although by less than in case monetary policy
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Figure 2: Adjustment to one-percent drop of external demand: unconstrained monetary
policy in Home (dashed line) vs constant-interest-rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and
exchange rate peg (dash-dotted line). Horizontal axes measure time in quarters. Vertical
axes measure deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady state output (in case
of quantities) or percent (in case of prices).
is unconstrained—net exports deteriorate by more. Overall, the contraction in both internal
and external demand causes a fall of domestic output which is about twice as large as in case
monetary policy is unconstrained.
The regime that performs worst, however, is the currency peg. This is because of deflation in
Foreign. If Foreign were not at the ZLB and, hence, would not have suffered a deflationary
drift, a peg would in fact have desirable features. Indeed, to the extent that a credible peg is
an implicit commitment to a stable price level, the transmission of domestic adverse demand
shocks would be muted by the peg. The reason is that any short-run fall in domestic prices
associated with such domestic demand shocks would in the medium or long run be offset
by positive domestic inflation (Cook and Devereux, 2014; Corsetti et al., 2013a). When the
foreign country is at the ZLB and the shock is a demand shock that originates in Foreign,
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Figure 3: Effect of domestic government spending increase: unconstrained monetary policy
(dashed line) vs constant-interest-rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and exchange rate
peg (dash-dotted line). Horizontal axes measure time in quarters. Vertical axes measure
deviations from the pre-shock path, in percent of steady state output (in case of quantities)
or percent (in case of prices).
instead, this conclusion is turned on its head. The implicit domestic commitment that a
pegging country makes to follow the unstable foreign price level works against the country.
Namely, it amplifies the domestic downturn, by generating expectations of sustained domestic
deflation. The terms of trade actually appreciate, exacerbating the contraction of domestic
net exports in response to the shock to foreign demand.
4.2 The scope for fiscal stabilization
Figure 3 traces the effect of an increase of government spending (itself depicted in the upper-
left panel). In the case of a free float, as long as monetary policy is unconstrained, the
fiscal expansion has moderate effects. With the monetary authority ensuring price stability,
more government spending leads to a monetary contraction and real appreciation. It raises
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output, but only at the cost of crowding out domestic consumption and net exports. The
multiplier is substantially below one. Conversely, fiscal policy is quite powerful when the
domestic policy rates are temporarily constant at the ZLB. Persistently higher government
spending raises expected inflation, thus lowering the long-term real rate: private consumption
rises substantially. At the same time, the fall in long-term rates causes the nominal exchange
rate to depreciate. Domestic consumption rises with domestic inflation. In addition, net
exports rise on the back of the real depreciation. Comparing the ZLB case across Figures
2 and 3 illustrates the “benign coincidence” that we emphasized in Section 3: under those
circumstances in which the external shocks become more damaging because of the ZLB, fiscal
policy is a powerful substitute for monetary stabilization, if exchange rates are flexible.
This benign coincidence breaks down, however, when the country pursues a currency peg.
Figure 3 shows that—contrary to conventional wisdom—fiscal policy is not particularly ef-
fective in a fixed exchange rate regime. Note that this is precisely the regime where the
adverse external shock is most consequential for Home output and consumption—compare,
again, Figures 2 and 3. The mechanism governing the transmission of fiscal policy, as dis-
cussed in Corsetti et al. (2013a), is illustrated by the panel in the middle of the figure: by
the working of purchasing power parity in the medium and the long run, under a peg, the
initial positive response of inflation to a government spending expansion will be offset over
time: after a fiscal expansion the price level in Home eventually reverts back to the price level
in Foreign. In the figure here, since Foreign did not receive any shocks, the Home price level
reverts to its pre-shock level. This is in sharp contrast to the evolution of Home prices when
Home monetary policy is constrained by the ZLB but pursues flexible exchange rates. There,
the Home price level keeps increasing over the entire life of the fiscal expansion. Comparing
the two scenarios, therefore, under a peg the overall monetary stance, measured by the rise
in long-term real rates is less rather than more accommodative; and the fiscal multiplier is
correspondingly lower.
4.3 Model extensions: financial frictions and sovereign risk
So far we have proceeded under the assumption of frictionless financial markets, both within
a country and across borders. This assumption is necessary in order to obtain the closed-
form results discussed in the previous section. Here we demonstrate that it is not particularly
consequential for macroeconomic dynamics. In what follows, we perform a sensitivity analysis
and relax the assumption of complete financial markets. We posit that cross-border asset
trade is limited to non-contingent nominal bonds. In addition, we consider the possibility
that Home is vulnerable to a deterioration in the markets’ assessment of sovereign risk.
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Drawing on our previous work (Corsetti et al., 2013b, 2014), we assume that sovereign risk in
Home increases when public debt builds up. Higher sovereign risk, in turn, induces a rise of
borrowing costs in the private sector (see also Bocola, forthcoming). This specification entails
that sovereign risk premia result in a contraction of domestic demand and, therefore, a drop
in current economic activity, independently of whether sovereign default actually takes place
or not. We provide some details on the modified model in Appendix A.5. Throughout we
continue to assume that Home is a small open economy.
Using the extended model, we first establish that, under our parameterization, the propaga-
tion of the external-demand shock (the source of this being, as before, a foreign saving shock)
is not fundamentally different if we move from the complete-market economy to an economy
where there is trade in nominally non-contingent bonds only. With cross-border trade in
non-contingent assets only, whether or not markets price sovereign risk, the transmission of
a foreign great recession remains least detrimental under a float and amid domestic price
stability, and most damaging under a peg—the zero lower bound case with floating exchange
rates being the intermediate case.
Figure 4 shows the dynamic adjustment in case of incomplete markets, but so far absent
sovereign risk. Comparing Figures 4 and 2 suggests that differences between the complete
and incomplete-market economy are marginal at best.14 Intuitively, the global shock that
we place at the core of our analysis is temporary. Self-insurance via intertemporal trade in
bonds and the equilibrium response of the terms of trade and real interest rate at the global
level allow a small open economy to achieve an allocation that is not too far from that with
perfect risk sharing (see, for instance, Cole and Obstfeld, 1991).
Next, we in addition allow for sovereign risk. Including the sovereign risk channel in the
model results in a mild amplification of the adverse effects of the foreign shock. Namely, as
output falls in Home in response to the external shock, government debt builds up due to
the working of automatic stabilizers (that we introduce in the model through a constant tax
rate which is proportional to income). The fiscal outlook worsens, affecting the probability
of default. Markets, in turn, call for a higher sovereign risk premium which impacts private
borrowing conditions in Home adversely. This reduces aggregate demand and activates an
adverse loop: lower demand translates into lower activity, hence higher deficits and debt;
higher debt raises sovereign risk and borrowing costs further.15 Quantitatively, however, the
14A qualitative difference worth mentioning concerns the response of net exports and consumption under a
float with an unconstrained monetary policy. In the complete markets model, the saving shock in the foreign
country generates a larger financial inflow into the Home country. Correspondingly, Home consumption rises,
if only at the margin, and the exchange rate depreciates. The capital inflow is less pronounced in the bond
economy. Home consumption falls, while a more pronounced depreciation produces a small trade surplus over
time.
15Under a float and an unconstrained monetary policy, sovereign risk causes more current and/or future
23
0 5 10 15
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
External demand
Float
Peg
ZLB
0 5 10 15
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Home output
0 5 10 15
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
Inflation
0 5 10 15
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0
Policy rate
0 5 10 15
-6
-4
-2
0
Price level
0 5 10 15
0
2
4
6
Exchange rate
0 5 10 15
-2
0
2
4
Terms of trade
0 5 10 15
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Private consumption
0 5 10 15
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
Net exports
Figure 4: Adjustment to one-percent drop of external demand under incomplete international
financial markets; unconstrained monetary policy in Home (dashed line) vs constant-interest-
rate period of 10 quarters (solid line) and exchange rate peg (dash-dotted line); see Figure 2
for details.
change in transmission is only moderate. Since the numerical results remain quite similar to
Figure 4, we omit a graph for this case.
Rather, we emphasize the dimension in which sovereign risk matters a lot, namely, the ef-
fectiveness of fiscal stabilization policy. In this dimension, indeed, the sovereign risk channel
is quite consequential. The effectiveness of fiscal stabilization may be eroded by a loss of
confidence when the government pursues deficit-financed expansions in times of a poor fiscal
outlook. Figure 5 shows the adjustment to an increase of Home government consumption by
one percent of GDP. The left column shows the responses of the economy under the float
monetary accommodation, reflected by exchange rate depreciation upfront. Although consumption falls, it
actually falls by less than in the absence of foreign risk—net exports are correspondingly lower. Monetary
accommodation and upfront depreciation is instead lower in the ZLB case: the fall in consumption is now more
pronounced than in the absence of sovereign risk, making room for a stronger net export dynamic. Under a
peg, sovereign risk exacerbates and magnifies the effects under the ZLB scenario.
24
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
Ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
Float
0 5 10 15
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
Po
lic
y 
ra
te
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
Te
rm
s 
of
 tr
ad
e
0 5 10 15
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
O
ut
pu
t
0 5 10 15
-2
-1
0
1
Co
ns
um
pt
io
n
0 5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
N
et
 e
xp
or
ts
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
ZLB
No SRC
SRC
0 5 10 15
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
0 5 10 15
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 5 10 15
-2
-1
0
1
0 5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
3
Peg
0 5 10 15
-0.2
-0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0 5 10 15
-1
0
1
2
0 5 10 15
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
0 5 10 15
-2
-1
0
1
0 5 10 15
-0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Figure 5: Effect of increase of government spending in Home w/ (dashed line) and w/o (solid
line) sovereign risk: see Figure 3 for details; international financial markets assumed to be
incomplete.
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and unconstrained Home monetary policy. The middle column corresponds to a float with
the ZLB constraint binding in Home. The panels on the right show the responses under the
permanent peg. In each of the panels, a solid line marks the responses that would prevail
absent the sovereign risk channel. The dashed line marks the responses with sovereign risk.
Focus on the panels in the fifth row. These show the response of Home consumption. The
columns pertain to the three scenarios for monetary policy. What is very important to note
is that sovereign risk starkly changes the transmission of fiscal policy. In particular, in all
three scenarios, government spending now crowds out domestic demand (see the blue dashed
lines). There is crowding out even at the zero lower bound. Without the sovereign risk
channel, instead, government spending crowded in private consumption (see the solid line in
the figure). That said, in spite of the crowding out of domestic consumption and somewhat
surprisingly, the effect of government spending on overall economic activity in Home is not
necessarily weaker with sovereign risk (see the 4th row). Indeed, sovereign risk increases the
spending multiplier under an unconstrained float (first column). For the other two scenarios,
the medium-term effect of fiscal spending on output is larger when there is sovereign risk. This
result is driven by the dynamics of net exports (bottom row), which record large surpluses in
all cases, either on impact (if exchange rates are flexible) or over time (under a peg), clearly
helped by a large real depreciation (3rd row). In the short-term, however, if monetary policy
is constrained by either the ZLB or a peg, sovereign risk means that fiscal effectiveness is
much reduced.
The consequence of sovereign risk for the exchange rate and economic dynamics is the sub-
ject of a small but significant debate. Based on the consequences of sovereign risk for the
exchange rate, Krugman (2014) strongly argues that prospective sovereign risk should not be
used as an argument against the use of countercyclical fiscal policy. If spreads rise with a
fiscal expansion—Krugman argues—their negative effects on output will be offset by a large
depreciation, which will boost external demand. Figure 5 substantiates but also qualifies
Krugman’s view.
Under a float, our results appear to lend support to Krugman (2014): the output multiplier
of public spending actually is larger with sovereign risk. Nonetheless, it is worth stressing
that the stronger expansion of output is accompanied by a sharp deterioration of domestic
consumption. That is, fiscal spending causes a sharp change in the composition of aggregate
demand, whereby a boom in exports more than offsets a contraction of internal demand. The
output expansion is largest when the policy rate is not constrained by the zero lower bound,
since the central bank can engineer a stronger response to the collapse in internal demand. It
is less pronounced, however, when monetary policy is constrained. At the zero lower bound,
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the exchange rate still adjusts sharply upfront, favoring large external surpluses. This offsets
the crowding out effect of government spending on domestic demand via the sovereign risk
channel. Under a peg, instead, there is no depreciation, hence with sovereign risk the spending
multiplier on impact becomes very small.
Our analysis makes clear that sovereign risk can make fiscal stabilization policy more effec-
tive, as Krugman has argued. There are several important provisos, however. First, all of this
crucially hinges on the the exchange rate regime. This is so because the extent to which the
exchange rate will depreciate amid sovereign risk reflects the degree of monetary accommoda-
tion. Second, while effective in preventing a contraction in economic activity, fiscal stimulus
amid sovereign risk in the simulations above does not prevent (but rather amplifies) the con-
traction in internal demand. Our reading of this is that, in light of the above, and especially
given the limits of our understanding of financial and fiscal crises, the arguments for dynamic
budget correction and policies maintaining a stable fiscal outlook remain strong.16
In the previous section, we have entertained the notion that the stabilization of large external
shocks under flexible exchange rates may benefit from a “benign coincidence”, with fiscal
policy becoming becomes most effective at stabilizing domestic activity when the external
shock is most detrimental. Earlier, we already qualified that the benign coincidence holds
only under flexible exchange rates. The analysis above, qualifies this further. The benign
coincidence does not only require floating exchange rates, it also applies reliably only when
sovereign risk is not an important consideration.
5 Conclusion
Almost three decades after the outburst of the global crisis, the world economy remains vul-
nerable. In particular, there is a risk that large global shocks once cause again the world
economy to fall into a great recession. This is a challenge to policymaking in small open
economies, which by their very openness to trade are particularly vulnerable to external
shocks. In this paper we provide a stylized analysis of the effectiveness of different mone-
tary and fiscal policies in a small open economy that faces a large external demand shock.
Specifcally, we model a shock to the rest of the world’s desire to save that occurs at a time
when policy rates in the rest of the world are constrained, for example, due to the zero lower
bound. The shock causes world aggregate demand to fall and a global deflationary crawl. We
reassess the effect that fiscal and monetary policies (in particular, the exchange rate regime)
16The strong response of net exports to a government-spending expansion is also noteworthy in light of
the ongoing controversy on currency wars. Our model suggests that, in a sovereign risk crisis, even fiscal
stabilization—typically targeted to sustain internal demand—tends to increase net saving in the economy, and
require currency depreciation to be effective.
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have on the evolution of the small open economy in the wake of the shock. We explicitly ac-
count for potential constraints on either policy, in the form of a zero lower bound constraint
on domestic monetary policy or an exchange-rate peg, or concerns with sovereign risk which
may constrain fiscal policy.
We analyze in detail the specific way in which a flexible exchange rate can act as a shock
absorber under circumstances which have been defining features of the great recession and
which may re-occur in the near future. A central result of our analysis is that for the exchange
rate to isolate the small open economy from the external shock, it needs to decouple domestic
inflation from the deflationary crawl that aﬄicts the world economy. This requires Home
policymakers to manage a depreciation drift in the nominal exchange rate, over and above
the nominal and real depreciation needed to buffer the Home economy from the collapse in
external demand alone.
If monetary policy cannot manage that drift, fiscal policy—in principle—can be used to
stabilize the small open economy. However, we find that fiscal policy will be an effective
tool only when the monetary regime that is such that it can accompany fiscal stimulus with
enough monetary accommodation, and, again, the country pursues an exchange rate regime
that insulates the evolution of the domestic price level from the price level abroad. If that
is the case, fiscal policy turns out to be particularly effective when the effect of the external
shock is largest, namely, when domestic monetary policy is temporarily constrained by the
zero lower bound. The same does not hold under an exchange rate peg.
Modern monetary theory indeed questions the conventional wisdom from the textbook ren-
dition of the Mundell-Fleming model, that fiscal policy is a reliable alternative to monetary
policy in a currency peg or a monetary union. Furthermore we find that the conventional
Mundell-Fleming logic is misleading if there is a loss of confidence in the sovereign debt mar-
ket that risks affecting the domestic private sector’s financial conditions. Indeed, whether
sovereign risk reduces the effectiveness of spending stimulus greatly depends on the monetary
regime as well. Sovereign risk greatly reduces the effectiveness of spending stimulus if the
small open economy pursues a pegged exchange rate, and to a lesser extent if its monetary
rates are constrained at the zero lower bound. The opposite is true when the small open
economy has opted for floating exchange rates and its monetary policy is not constrained.
In sum, we find that the risk of another great recession strengthens the case for flexible
exchange rates.
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A A New Keynesian open-economy model
Our model is a simplified version of the two-country model put forward in Corsetti et al.
(2012), as we abstract from investment and wage rigidities. Home trades with the rest of the
world, consolidated in a Foreign country. Both countries produce a variety of country-specific
intermediate goods, with the number of intermediate good producers normalized to unity.
A fraction n of firms is located in Home, the remaining firms (n, 1] are located in Foreign.
Analogously, Home accounts for a fraction n ∈ [0, 1] of the global population. Intermediate
goods are traded across borders while final goods which are bundles of intermediate goods, are
not. Prices of intermediate goods are sticky in producer-currency terms. Households supply
labor services only within the country where they reside, but trade assets internationally. For
the sake of analytical tractability, in our baseline, they will trade a complete set of state-
contingent assets.
Many of the features of the model are standard, so we keep the exposition short. We focus our
exposition on Home. When necessary, we refer to foreign variables by means of an asterisk.
A.1 Households
There is a representative household in each country. Letting Ct denote a consumption basket
(defined below) and Ht labor supply, the objective of the household is
maxEt
∞∑
k=0
(eξt+kβk)
(
lnCt+k −
H1+ϕt+k
1 + ϕ
)
, (28)
where ξt is a zero-mean shock to the time-discount factor, β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor,
and ϕ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labor supply.
In our baseline, the household trades a complete set of state-contingent securities with the
rest of the world. Letting Xt+1 denote the payoff in units of domestic currency in period t+ 1
of the portfolio held at the end of period t, the budget constraint of the household is given by
Et {ρt,t+1Xt+1} − Xt = (1− τ)(WtHt + Υt)− Tt − PtCt.
Here ρt,t+1 is the nominal stochastic discount factor. Wt is the nominal wage. Υt are the
domestic firms’ nominal profits. τ is a constant tax rate, Tt are lump-sum taxes. Pt is the
price index for the final consumption basket. The consumption baskets themselves are not
traded across borders. Their components are, however. The baskets consist of bundles At
and Bt of, respectively, domestically and foreign produced intermediate goods. The final
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consumption basket Ct (C
∗
t ) is produced using the following aggregation technology
Ct =
{
[(1− (1− n)υ)] 1σ A
σ−1
σ
t + [(1− n)υ)]
1
σ B
σ−1
σ
t
} σ
σ−1
, (29)
C∗t =
{
[nυ]
1
σ (A∗t )
σ−1
σ + [(1− nυ)] 1σ (B∗t )
σ−1
σ
} σ
σ−1
, (30)
where σ measures the terms of trade elasticity of the relative demand for domestically pro-
duced goods and υ ∈ [0, 1] measures the home bias.17
The bundles of domestically and imported intermediate goods are defined as follows
At =
[(
1
n
) 1

∫ n
0
At(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
, Bt =
[(
1
1− n
) 1

∫ 1
n
Bt(j)
−1
 dj
] 
−1
, (31)
where At(j) and Bt(j) denote intermediate goods produced in Home and Foreign, respectively,
and  measures the elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods produced within the
same country.
The household minimizes expenditures subject to (29) and (31). Specifically, let Pt(j) denote
the price of an intermediate good expressed in domestic currency and Et the nominal exchange
rate (the price of foreign currency in terms of domestic currency). We assume that the law
of one price holds, so that
EtP ∗t (j) = Pt(j). (32)
The household’s expenditure minimization implicitly defines a demand function for intermedi-
ate goods. Assuming that government consumption, Gt, is a bundle isomorphic to final goods,
but consisting of domestically produced goods only, global demand for a generic intermediate
good produced in Home and Foreign is, respectively:
Y Dt (j) =
(
Pt(j)
PHt
)−{(PHt
Pt
)−σ [ (1− (1− n)υ)Ct
+(1− n)υQσt C∗t
]
+Gt
}
, (33)
Y Dt (j)
∗ =
(
P ∗t (j)
P ∗Ft
)−{(P ∗Ft
P ∗t
)−σ [
nυQ−σt Ct + (1− nυ)C∗t
]}
, (34)
where price indices are given by
PHt =
[
1
n
∫ n
0
Pt(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
, PFt =
[
1
1− n
∫ 1
n
Pt(j)
1−dj
] 1
1−
, (35)
17This specification follows Sutherland (2005) and De Paoli (2009). With υ = 1, there is no home bias: if the
relative price of foreign and domestic goods is unity, the fraction of domestically produced goods which ends
up in the production of final goods is equal to n, while imports account for a share of 1−n. Importantly, final
goods are identical across countries in this case. A lower value of υ implies that the fraction of domestically
produced goods in final goods exceeds the share of domestic production in the world economy. If υ = 0, there
is full home bias and no trade across countries.
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Pt =
[
(1− (1− n)υ)P 1−σHt + ((1− n)υ)P 1−σFt
] 1
1−σ , (36)
P ∗t =
[
nυ (P ∗Ht)
1−σ + (1− nυ) (P ∗Ft)1−σ
] 1
1−σ
, (37)
and
Qt =
EtP ∗t
Pt
(38)
measures the real exchange rate.
A.2 Firms
Intermediate good producers sell under monopolistic competition, facing the demand function
(33). The production function is Cobb-Douglas:
Yt(j) = Ht(j) (39)
where Ht(j) denotes labor services employed by firm j ∈ [0, n] in period t.
We assume that prices are set in the currency of the producer and that price setting is
constrained exogenously a` la Calvo, so that in each period only a fraction of intermediate
good producers (1− α) may adjust its price. When firm j has the opportunity, it sets P˜t(j)
to maximize the expected discounted value of net profits:
max
P˜t(j)
∞∑
k=0
αt+kEtρt,t+k
{
P˜t(j)Y
D
t+k(j)−Ψ
[
Y Dt+k(j)
]}
subject to the demand function (33) and the production function (39); Ψ
[
Y Dt+k(j)
]
mea-
sures costs. Domestic households own the firms, so profits are discounted with the domestic
households’ stochastic discount factor.
A.3 Monetary and fiscal policy
We assume that monetary policy is conducted by adjusting the short-term nominal interest
rate:
Rt ≡ 1/Etρt,t+1.
As regards fiscal and budget policy, we assume that Home government spending falls on an
aggregate of domestic intermediate goods only. We also posit that intermediate goods are
assembled so as to minimize costs. Thus the price index for government spending is given by
PH,t. In the first part of the paper, without loss of generality, we assume that the government
budget is balanced in each period by means of lump-sum taxes Tt. In the second part of the
paper, we will consider a richer specification, so as to account for the possibility of sovereign
risk.
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A.4 Equilibrium
In equilibrium, firms and households optimally choose prices and quantities subject to their
respective constraints and initial conditions while markets clear. At the level of inter-
mediate goods we have Yt(j) = Yt(j)
D. Defining an index for aggregate output Yt =(∫ 1
0 Y
−1

t (j)dj
) 
−1
, we obtain
Yt =
(
PHt
Pt
)−σ
[(1− (1− n)υ)Ct + (1− n)υQσt C∗t ] +Gt. (40)
Labor markets clear if
Ht =
∫ n
0
Ht(j)dj (41)
Finally, asset markets clear by Walras’ law.
In our analysis we focus on the limiting case n→ 0 for the size of the domestic economy:
Yt =
(
PHt
Pt
)−σ
[(1− υ)Ct + υQσt C∗t ] +Gt,
Y ∗t = C∗t .
This makes the Home economy de facto a small open economy. Foreign, instead, operates
like a closed economy. But – importantly – it may be a source of shocks for Home.
A.5 Incomplete financial markets
We also consider a variant of the model where financial markets are incomplete. Specifically, in
the modified model, we restrict asset trade to nominally non-contingent bonds only. Moreover,
we relax the assumption that government debt is neutral and allow it to impact the economy
through the sovereign risk channel. Denote with Dt the stock of nominal debt issued by the
fiscal authorities, assumed to have a maturity of one period. The period budget constraint of
the government reads as follows:
QD,tDt = Dt−1[1− δI(default in t+ 1)] +Gt − τYt − Tt, (42)
where δ > 0 is the fixed haircut that the government applies to private holders of its own
debt in those states of the world in which it defaults. I(default in t + 1) is the indicator
function that takes a value of one in case the government defaults and is zero otherwise. As
in Corsetti et al. (2013b), the probability of default in period t, pt, may increase in the level
of debt relative to steady-state output according to the following random function:
pt = Fbeta
(
Dt
4Y
1
d
;αbg , βbg
)
. (43)
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Here d denotes the upper end of the support for the debt-to-GDP ratio and Fbeta marks the
CDF of the beta distribution. That is, from an ex ante perspective, the government applies
the haircut δ in the next period with probability pt+1. With the opposite probability, the
government will comply with its promises to pay.
Finally, we postulate that lump-sum taxes adjust to stabilize debt in the following way:
Tt = φdDt, with φd > 1− β.
Households trade two discount bonds on international financial markets, one paying one unit
of domestic currency in the next period, the other one unit of foreign currency. Specifically,
letting Bt denote the domestic-currency bond and B
∗
t the foreign-currency bond, traded at
price QB,t and QB∗,t, respectively, the budget constraint of a household in Home reads as
follows
QB,tBt +QB∗,tB
∗
t Et + PtCt = (1− τ)Yt − Tt +Bt−1 +B∗t−1Et, (44)
where τ is a constant tax rate.
For tractability, we assume that sovereign default is possible only in the Home country and
that the marginal investor in sovereign bonds is a small mass of risk-neutral investors in
Foreign. Since Home bonds are subject to both outright sovereign default (a haircut), and
the risk of changes in the price of currencies, the bond price schedule is
QD,t = βEt {[1− δI(default in t+ 1)] Et/Et+1} . (45)
Sovereign default risk in the Home country, in turn, is assumed to spill over to private-sector
bond prices as follows
QB,t = R
−1
t Et[1− ηδI(default in t+ 1)], QB∗,t = βEt[1− ηδI(default in t+ 1]. (46)
where the parameter η ≥ 0 captures the degree of spillover of sovereign risk into private
borrowing. Following Corsetti et al. (2013b) we rationalize a value of η larger than zero
by the observation that private-sector contracts may not be fully enforced in the event of a
sovereign default.18 Importantly, however, we assume that even though lenders may not be
fully serviced in the event of sovereign default, borrowers may not retain resources either.
Rather, resources are lost in the process.19
We reconsider our earlier experiments in our modified model, based on simulations through-
out. For this purpose we rely on a first order approximation to the equilibrium conditions
18Specification (46) follows Kriwoluzky et al. (2015).
19Hence, whether the sovereign defaults or not has no direct bearing on the household’s budget constraint.
Otherwise, borrowers’ interest rate would rise with sovereign risk only notionally, not affecting behaviour up
to first order, as explained in Cu´rdia and Woodford (2009). Bocola (forthcoming) models the pass-through of
sovereign risk while explicitly accounting for financial intermediation.
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around a deterministic steady state. As before, there is no debt and inflation in steady state.
The strength of the sovereign risk channel is captured by three parameters: the sensitivity of
Fbeta to the debt level (how steeply the default risk rises in debt), the size of the haircut in the
event of default, δ, and the spillover parameter η. Eventually, our assumptions imply that an
increase of sovereign debt by one percent of GDP, raises the interest rates faced by the private
sector by half a basis point. This corresponds to a scenario of severe fiscal stress, according
to our earlier work (Corsetti et al., 2013b). We ensure stationarity by assuming that the
private-sector interest rate is also elastic in the net foreign asset position of the private sector
(Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe, 2003).
B System of linear difference equations
A linear approximation to the equilibrium conditions of the complete markets model yields
the following system of expectational difference equations. Small letters indicate the log
deviation of a variable from its steady-sate value. We first focus on the baseline model
allowing for n ∈ [0, 1].
B.1 Baseline
Households supply labor according to
w˜t = ϕht + ct +
τ
1− τ τ˜t (B.1)
w˜∗t = ϕh
∗
t + c
∗
t +
τ
1− τ τ˜
∗
t , (B.2)
where w˜t is the (consumption) real wage. The optimal time path of consumption satisfies:
ct = Et(ct+1)− (it − Etpit+1) (B.3)
c∗t − ξ∗t = Et(c∗t+1 − ξ∗t+1)− (i∗t − Etpi∗t+1). (B.4)
Under complete financial markets, we have the following risk-sharing condition:
(ct − ξt)− (c∗t − ξ∗t ) = qt = (1− υ)st. (B.5)
Intermediate good firms’ price-setting behavior is given by
piHt = βEtpiHt+1 + κmct (B.6)
pi∗t = βEtpi
∗
t+1 + κmc
∗
t , (B.7)
36
where marginal costs are given by
mct = w˜t − qH,t (B.8)
mc∗t = w˜
∗
t − q∗F,t. (B.9)
The aggregate production function is given by
yt = ht (B.10)
y∗t = h
∗
t . (B.11)
Relative prices satisfy
piHt = qHt − qHt−1 + pit (B.12)
pi∗Ft = q
∗
Ft − q∗Ft−1 + pi∗t , (B.13)
as well as
−qt + qHt = q∗Ht (B.14)
−qt + qFt = q∗Ft. (B.15)
From the definition of the real exchange rate we have
qFt − qFt−1 = det + pi∗t − pit + q∗Ft − q∗Ft−1. (B.16)
Deflated price indices
0 = (1− (1− n)ω)qHt + (1− n)ωqFt (B.17)
0 = (1− nω)q∗Ft + nωq∗Ht. (B.18)
Finally, there is market clearing:
yt =(1− n)υ(cyc∗t + σcyqt)− σcyqHt + (1− (1− n)υ)cyct + (1− cy)gt (B.19)
y∗t =nυ(ct − σqt)− σq∗Ft + (1− nυ)c∗t . (B.20)
B.2 Incomplete markets model
The incomplete markets model assumes n → 0, that is, Home is small. Instead of the risk-
sharing condition B.5, equilibrium require the following UIP condition to hold:
rt − r∗t = Etet+1 − et.
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Also, we need to keep track private-sector bond holds. Assuming that foreign-currency bonds
are in zero net supply we have:
βbˆt + cˆt = bˆt−1 + (1− τ)yt − cˆt − cyqH,t − tˆt. (B.21)
(B.22)
If the sovereign risk-channel is operative, we need to keep track of government debt:
βdˆrt+1 = dˆ
r
t + gˆt − tˆrt − τyt (B.23)
tˆt = ψddˆt. (B.24)
Here the second equation determines the adjustment of taxes to debt. Eventually, the
sovereign risk channel alters the Euler equation in Home
ct = Etct+1 − (it − Etpit+1 + χdt + γbˆt),
where χ captures the pass-through of sovereign risk (which rises in public debt) into private
borrowing conditions; γ makes the effective interest rate dependent on the net foreign asset
position.
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